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The “Death” Of Monads:  







      In his Monadology (Mon.), §73 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
(1646−1716) argues:  
 
        There is never total generation nor, strictly speaking, perfect    
        death, death consisting in the separation of the soul. And  
        what we call generations are developments and growths, as  
        what we call deaths are enfoldings [developpemens] and  
        diminutions [accroissemens]1  
 
      This account is very strange. So there is no “perfect” death at 
all? What are these enfoldings and diminutions? It is not 
immediately clear at all what Leibniz means by these cryptic 
terms. And it gets even more peculiar when we look at the 
previous section of the text:  
 
        The soul changes body only little by little and by degrees, so  
        that it is never stripped at once of all its organs. There is often  
        metamorphosis in animals, but there is never metempsychosis  
        nor transmigration of souls; there are also no completely  
        separated souls, nor spirits without bodies. God alone is  
        completely detached from bodies.2 
                                                     
1 GP VI, p. 619; AG, p. 222. I refer to the following editions of 
Leibniz’s texts: A=Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, 
AG=Philosophical Essays, DSR=De summa rerum, GP=Die 
Philosophischen Schriften, H=Theodicy, L=Philosophical Papers 
and Letters, LGR=Leibniz on God and Religion, LTS=Leibniz and 
The Two Sophies, PW=Philosophical Writings, RB= New Essays 
on Human Understanding.  
2 GP VI, p. 619; AG, p. 222. 
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    These passages clearly refer to some kind of fundamental 
change in the course of a creature’s life. What would that be? 
Explaining Leibniz’s reasons for this view is the topic of my 
paper.3 I will start with some metaphysical preliminaries and then 
continue to discuss the anti-deaths of animals and human beings. 
In addition, I will reflect on Leibniz’s views on the afterlife and 
present a naturalistic reading of his views concerning man’s 
existence after death.   
 
Some Metaphysical Considerations 
 
    Let us start with some relevant basics of Leibniz’s metaphysics. 
Each possible world (our world, Leibniz argues, is the best of all 
possible worlds) consists of an infinite number of simple, but 
dissimilar substances which Leibniz in his later philosophy calls 
monads. The monads, which change constantly according to 
dynamical laws, but have no parts, are “windowless” (Mon. §7 & 
10): that is to say, they have no direct interaction with each other. 
Instead, they express or “mirror” each other in accordance with the 
pre-established harmony of substances, established by God in 
creation. It is essential to note that monads can begin only by 
creation and end by annihilation (Mon. §19).4 Therefore Leibniz’s 
metaphysics does not allow death in the sense that a substance is 
destroyed. This is consistent with the pre-established harmony, as 
the harmony would be disturbed or arguably even destroyed if 
some substances were eliminated.   
 
      The pre-established harmony is also the key element in 
Leibniz’s psychophysical parallelism. The interaction of the mind 
and the body is founded on the pre-established harmony, so that 
each perception of the body affects the mind, and conversely, all 
                                                     
3 Thanatology has not been a popular topic in Leibniz -studies, but 
in recent years a new interest in his biology has created some 
interest in his views on the cycle of life concerning beings of 
nature.  
4 See also, for example, Theodicy, §396 (H, p. 365), Metaphysical 
Consequences of the Principle of Reason, §12 (PW, p. 177) and A 
Specimen of Discoveries (PW, p. 81). 
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mental functions, such as emotions and volitions, have an effect on 
the human body.5 The body is an aggregate of monads, dominated 
by one higher level- monad, the mind, which is able to perceive  
distinctly in contrast to the other monads, and therefore it is able to 
reach truths of reason and have a self-consciousness (Mon. §70-
72, 82-83). In animals, the dominating substance is an animal soul, 
capable of sensation and memory, but not reasoning.6 
 
      According to Leibniz’s late views, in all monads there are only 
two functions: perception and appetite (Mon. §14−15, 17).7 
Perception is “a passing state which involves and represents a 
multitude in the unity [monad]”.8 In other words, perceiving is 
representing the constant changes in the other monads that 
comprise the external world. Also, each substance has an internal 
principle of change, which Leibniz calls appetite or substantial 
form. This principle consists of primitive active force comparable 
to Hobbesian or Spinozian conatus.  
 
      The rational soul’s appetite is directed towards goodness, 
activity and perfection, but the appetite of animal souls and 
entelechies or simple monads is directed to clearer perceptions. An 
essential distinction between the kingdom of grace and the 
kingdom of nature is related to this division between rational and 
non-rational being (Mon. §87). The kingdom of grace consists of 
rational souls, or spirits, and God, and the kingdom of nature 
consists of living souls, that is, animals and plants, and entelechies 
or souls. The relationship between the two kingdoms is again 
defined by the pre-established harmony. 
 
                                                     
5 See New System of Nature, AG, pp. 138-145. 
6 New Essays on Human Understanding (NE), Preface, A VI 6, pp. 
50-51. 
7 The late view presented in Monadology has raised a long-
standing discussion among the commentators as to whether the 
view, according to which all substances are mental is 
representative of his philosophy at all times. I will have to ignore 
the discussion here.  
8 Mon. §14; AG, p. 214. 
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Transformations of Animals 
 
      Leibniz’s description of death as a sort of enfolding or 
diminution applies to both human beings and animals. With 
respect to the composite substances of animals, this can be 
understood as both in organic and cognitive terms. Let us start 
with cognition.  
 
      In the animal the highest monad is an animal soul which 
communicates with its related body (consisting of lower level- 
monads) through the pre-established harmony. We saw above that 
the animal souls are capable of sensations and memory. The 
animal is capable of clearer perceptions than non-living beings 
such as plants. In addition, they can have memory and therefore 
the animals can be called souls (Mon. §19).9 Besides sensations 
and memory, animals can also have feelings (Theodicy, §250).  
 
    Compared to human beings, the cognitive capability of animals 
is limited, as they cannot reach distinct perceptions which are the 
foundation of reasoning and self-consciousness. At most they can 
have clear, but confused perceptions which are such that one 
“cannot enumerate one by one marks sufficient for differentiating 
a thing from others, even though the thing does indeed have such 
marks and requisites into which its notion can be resolved”.10 
Examples of these kinds of perceptions are colors, smells, tastes 
and other subjective sensations. Much more common perceptions 
in both animals and human beings are insensible, “little” 
perceptions which are fleeting, confused cognition.  
 
      When the animals “die” or are “unclothed” (PNG §6), their 
cognitive level is reduced to the level of these confused, minute 
perceptions and they simply stop having any higher -level  
perceptions for a time. This state is not eternal. After a certain time 
                                                     
9 Leibniz was consistently critical against Descartes’s view that 
animals are mere machines (Principles of Nature and Grace, 
based on Reason (PNG) §4). 
10 Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas, A VI, 4, p. 586; 
AG, p. 24.  
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(Leibniz is not clear how long the “death” lasts11) they start to 
have higher -level perceptions again (are ”reclothed” (PNG §6)) 
and start another stage of their lives. It is evident, then, that 
Leibniz thinks that living beings will “wake up” or generate from 
death, which is really a kind of stupor, a state of confusion where 
only minute perceptions are present.  
 
      In organic terms, the animal or natural machine, as Leibniz 
calls them in New System of Nature, is ensouled and its striving is 
founded on a substantial form or law-of-the-series which includes 
all its history. In death, the body of an animal folds up, 
compresses, concentrates or withdraws, but the substantial form 
continues to exist and guarantees the identity and unity of the 
organic body.12 So when the animal “wakes up” and its organs 
start to grow again, it is the same animal although its appearance 
may be different.  
       
      The body never perishes totally, but persists in tiny particles 
and transforms into another one. Leibniz argued against the 
Platonic view of  transmigration of souls, that a soul moves from 
one body to another one when the organic body it is connected to 
is destroyed. He says that there may be metamorphosis (as, for 
example, when a caterpillar changes into a butterfly), but no 
metempsychosis or transmigration.13 In the Preface of NE Leibniz 
says:   
 
        The misconception…that preservation of the souls of beasts  
        would lead one to metempsychosis and to their  
                                                     
11 It seems to be a long period. In PNG, §4 Leibniz says that the 
Cartesians have confused a long stupor which arises from a great 
confusion of perceptions with death strictly speaking, in which all 
perceptions cease (AG, p. 208). In NE II, xxvii Leibniz says: 
“Perceptions which are at present insensible may grow some day: 
nothing is useless, and eternity provides great scope for change” 
(A VI, 6, 242; RB, 242).  
12 Lamarra 1996, pp. 88−89. See also New System of Nature, AG, 
pp. 140−142.  
13 New System, AG, pp. 140-151. 
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        transmigration from body to body…has resulted, in my  
        opinion, in their overlooking the natural way to explain the  
        preservation of the soul. This has done great harm to natural  
        religion, and has led some to believe that our immortality is  
        just a miraculous gift from God.14  
 
      Related to this theory of metamorphosis is the theory of 
preformation, according to which bodies in nature are never 
produced from chaos or putrefaction, but always through seeds in 
which there is some preformation.15 When the pre-formed seeds 
are  in place, no more is required than that bodies act in 
accordance with mechanical laws.16 Leibniz says:  
 
        The animal itself was there, and through conception this  
        animal was merely prepared for a great transformation, in  
        order to become an animal of another kind. Something  
        similar is seen outside generation, as when worms become  
        flies, and caterpillars become butterflies.17  
  
      In this mechanical development the organic and cognitive 
changes are related, as Leibniz argues in Reflections on the 
Doctrine of a Single Universal Spirit:  
 
        When an animal is deprived of organs capable of giving it  
        sufficiently distinct perceptions, it does not follow that the  
        animal has left no smaller and more uniform perceptions or  
        that it is deprived of all its organs and all its perceptions. Its   
        organs are merely enveloped and reduced to a small volume,  
        but the order of nature requires that everything be developed  
        again sometime and return to a noticeable state and that there  
                                                     
14 A VI, 6, 59; RB, 59. 
15 On preformation theory, see Phemister 2015. See also Mon. 
§74-76. 
16 Phemister 2011, p. 43. See also On Nature Itself, §2 (AG, p. 
156).  
17 Mon. §74; AG, p. 222. 
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        be a definite well-regulated progression in its changes which  
        helps  to bring things to fruition and perfection.18  
 
Death of Rational Souls 
 
      Transformation or metamorphosis concerns only animal soul, 
not rational soul, that is, man, who “must in this regard have 
special prerogatives for safeguarding his personhood”.19 In this 
section I will discuss how death takes place in human or rational 
souls.  
 
      In cognitive terms, the death of human beings does not differ 
very much from the death of animals, except that the cognitive 
change is far greater in scope. For human beings, perceptions vary 
from confused, minute perceptions to clear and distinct ones and 
beyond, all the way to adequate and even intuitive cognition.20 
Some of the perceptions are conscious, that is, clear and distinct 
perceptions. We are able to reflect on them, “perceive that we are 
perceiving” or have an apperception as Leibniz says in Mon. §14. 
Despite the human ability for clear and distinct perceptions, 
reasoning is always limited by minute perceptions which mingle 
with the higher level -perceptions.21  
 
      The mind is in constant change due to the substantial form and 
its striving is founded on the stimuli provided by the perceptions 
of which most are minute, confused ones.  
           
        There are hundreds of indications leading us to  conclude     
        that at every moment there is in us an infinity of perceptions,      
        unaccompanied by awareness or reflection; that is, of  
        alternations in the soul itself, of which we are unaware    
                                                     
18 GP VI, pp. 534-535; L, pp. 557-558. 
19 NE, Preface; A VI, 6, p. 55; RB, p. 55. 
20 For Leibniz’s hierarchy of perceptions, see Meditations on 
Cognition, Truth and Ideas, A VI, 4, pp. 585-592. 
21 The minute perceptions have also positive functions in Leibniz’s 
philosophy. See NE, Preface, A VI, 6, pp. 53-58. 
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        because these impressions are either sufficiently distinctive      
        on their own.22 
 
      The minute perceptions play a special role in forming the 
personal identity despite the fact that the metaphysical foundation 
of the identity of a person is provided by the substantial form (NE 
II, xxvii).  
 
        These insensible perceptions also indicate and constitute the     
        same individual, which is characterized by the vestiges or  
        expressions which the perceptions preserve from the  
        individual’s former states, thereby connecting these with  
        his present state…that is why death can only be a sleep,  
        and not lasting one at that: the perceptions merely cease to  
        be sufficiently distinct.23 
 
      Leibniz suggests that death of a man in cognitive terms is 
comparable to animals. It is not real, but only a case where the 
clarity and distinctness of perceptions are reduced to the level of 
confused, minute perceptions for a period of time. He wrote to 
Sophia Charlotte, Queen of Prussia:  
 
        In death, or rather the appearance of death, since I take it only  
        for an envelopment, we do not lose life, sensation or reason,   
        but what prevents us from noticing that for a time is the  
        confusion, that is, the fact that at that time we have an infinity  
        of little perceptions all at once, in which there is no single    
        one which is clearly distinguished from the others.24 
 
      The cognitive change can also be seen as a change of place in 
the hierarchy of monads: the rational soul loses its place and 
descends to the level of a simple substance. In the letter to Sophie 
Charlotte Leibniz again refers to sleep, and it is clear that this state 
of confusedness is only temporary. Therefore death does not 
annihilate memory, so traces of our perceptions are preserved until 
                                                     
22 NE, Preface, A VI, 6, p. 53; RB, p. 53. 
23 NE, Preface, A VI, 6, p. 55; RB, p. 55. 
24 GP VI, p. 522; LTS, p. 296. 
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the next stage when we eventually start to perceive clearly and 
distinctly again. Leibniz explains sleep in the same way, so death 
can be compared to dreamless sleep.25 
 
The Afterlife     
 
      I will return to the organic aspects of death of human beings in 
a moment. First it is useful to discuss the spiritual state of human 
beings after death. Death and anti-death is essentially related to 
Leibniz’s distinction between the kingdoms of grace and nature. 
Because of their ability of reasoning, human beings are moral 
creatures whereas animals act instinctively. They are part of nature 
and have an instrumental value for higher beings, that is, human 
beings and God. Human beings are ends in themselves, as they are 
capable of knowing the system of the universe (Mon. §83). In A 
Specimen of Discoveries (1686) Leibniz leaves no doubt about the 
superiority of human beings in the hierarchy of substances:  
 
        It is clear that the minds are the most important part of the  
        universe, and that everything was established for their sake;  
        that is, in choosing the order of things, the greatest account  
        was taken of them; all things being arranged in such a way  
        that they appear the more beautiful the more they are  
        understood.26 
                                                     
25 In his early fragment on dreams (L, pp. 113-115) Leibniz 
follows Descartes in thinking that in dreams we are disconnected 
from the world in the sense that our thoughts are confused and do 
not follow the common logic of our waking state. Waking up is 
remembering oneself and being able to connect the present state to 
other events in life (L, p. 114).  
26 GP, VII, p. 316; PW, p. 83. In Metaphysical Consequences of 
the Principle of Reason, §12 Leibniz says that the kingdom of 
nature serves the kingdom of grace (PW, 177). As examples he 
gives silkworms which weave and bees that make honey (PW, p. 
84). However, much later in PNG §15 he argues that “Nature itself 
leads to grace, and grace perfects nature by making use of it” (AG, 
p. 212).  
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      However, the elevated position of human beings presupposes 
moral responsibility to divine justice, as Leibniz argues in NE II, 
xxvii, §9:  
 
        I also hold this opinion that consciousness or the sense of I  
        proves moral or personal identity. And that is how I   
        distinguish the incessancy of a beast’s soul from the     
        immortality of the soul of man: both of them preserve real,     
        physical identity; but it is consonant with the rules of divine  
        providence that in man’s case the soul should also retain a  
        moral identity which is apparent to ourselves, so as to  
        constitute the same person, which is therefore sensitive to  
        punishments and rewards.27  
 
      The rationality of human beings makes them images of the 
divinity itself, that is, moral beings. They have access to God in a 
special way: through their reason they are able to imitate his 
actions, as there is only a difference of degree between human 
beings and God. They enter into a society with God and are 
citizens of the kingdom of grace (where final causes determine 
their actions) while non-rational animals and bodies of human 
beings remain the citizens of the kingdom of nature which is the 
realm of mechanical laws (Mon., §79 & §83; PNG §15). 
  
      In the context of the Lutheranism of Leibniz’s time his view is 
quite natural – human beings should be responsible for their moral 
conduct to God, otherwise there would be no motivation for them 
to act virtuously in this life. But what exactly happens to the 
rational soul after “death”? We have seen that death is a sort of 
sleep and that one can “wake up” from this sleep. Human beings 
can preserve their moral identity which exists as the substantial 
form and either be citizens of the city of God as a reward of their 
virtuous life or suffer from a punishment if they have been evil.  
 
       Let us first look at the destiny of the virtuous human beings. 
Leibniz describes the city of God (named after the famous work of 
Augustine) in Monadology §83-84.:   
                                                     
27 A VI, 6, p. 236; RB, p. 236. 
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        Minds are also images of the divinity itself, or the author of  
        nature, capable of knowing the system of the universe, and  
        imitating something of it through their systematic  
        representations of it, each mind being like a little divinity in  
        its own realm. That is what makes minds capable of entering  
        into a kind of society with God, and allows him to be, in  
        relation to them, not only what an inventor is to his machine  
        (as God is in relation to the other creatures) but also what a  
        prince is to his subjects, and even what a father is to his  
        children.28  
 
      Leibniz does not say exactly what awaits human beings in this 
society with God, but relies on Christian arguments. For example, 
in PNG §16 he says:  
 
        Although reason cannot teach us the details of the great  
        future, which are reserved for revelation, reason itself assures  
        us that things are made in a way that surpasses our wishes.29  
 
      However, later in the same section Leibniz characterizes the 
citizens of the city of God. They feel intellectual passions such as 
joy, hope and especially pure love (which is taking pleasure in the 
beloved). Pure love towards God lead us to find our pleasure in his 
perfections, as Leibniz lavishly declares in the last section of 
Monadology (§90):30  
 
        Under this perfect government, there will be no good action  
        that is unrewarded, no bad action that goes unpunished, and  
        everything must result in the well-being of the good, that is,    
        of those who are not dissatisfied in this great state, those who    
        trust providence, after having done their duty, and who love      
        and imitate the author of all good, as they should, finding  
        pleasure in the consideration of his perfections according to  
        the nature of genuinely pure love, which takes pleasure in the  
                                                     
28 GP VI, p. 621; AG, pp. 223-224. 
29 GP VI, p. 605; AG, p. 212. 
30 Of feeling universal perfection and knowing how to promote it, 
see Roinila 2016. 
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        happiness of the beloved. This is what causes wise and  
        virtuous persons to work for all that appears to be in  
        conformity with the presumptive or antecedent divine  
        will…31  
 
      In PNG §18 Leibniz says that “the love of God also fulfills our 
hopes, and leads us down the road of supreme happiness.”32 Thus, 
loving God produces a kind of well-being or blessedness for the 
virtuous man in the city of God. However, in the same section 
Leibniz warns that happiness is never complete, but “must consist 
in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and new perfections”.33 It 
is activity, a systematic striving to promote perfection, which is 
also related to development of cognitive abilities (NE II, xxi, §72). 
This process-like nature of happiness suggests that our striving in 
the afterlife will not end, however virtuous we have been in our 
lifetime. Loving God requires that we systematically seek his 
satisfaction. 
 
       In the citation from Monadology above, Leibniz discusses 
God’s presumptive or antecedent will. It is indeed a challenge for 
human beings to predict what God would want us to do. However, 
the general guidelines have already been given – loving our fellow 
human beings and God will lead us to the right direction. In 
addition, in some of his writings Leibniz argues that a good 
intention is essential in our moral conduct. For example, in §4 of 
Discourse on Metaphysics he writes:  
 
        In order to act in accordance with the love of God, it is not  
        sufficient to force ourselves to be patient; rather, we must  
        truly be satisfied with everything that has come to us  
        according his will…we must act in accordance with what we  
        presume to be the will of God, insofar as we can judge it,  
        trying with all our might to contribute to the general good and  
        especially to the embellishment and perfection of that which  
                                                     
31 GP VI, p. 622; AG, pp. 224-225. 
32 GP VI, p. 606; AG, p. 213. 
33 Ibid. 
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        affects us or that which is near us, that which is, so to speak,   
        in our grasp.34  
 
      What then, can we presume to be the will of God? As God is 
the architect of both kingdoms of grace and nature, it is safe to say 
that nature reflects his perfections.35 So when we see a rainbow, 
for example, we can marvel at the perfections of its creator. 
Therefore scientific study of nature gives us some idea of the 
essence of God and his ways. Leibniz was active in promoting co-
operation of scientists and founding of scientific academies for 
just this reason − a Leibnizian wise man promotes science as a 
method to please God, for increase of knowledge is useful in 
number of ways, for example in medicine.  
 
    However, being virtuous and reaching happiness in one’s 
lifetime is not an easy task as Leibniz explains:  
 
        If we are to make good use of the art of inference, we need an     
        art of bringing things to mind, another of estimating  
        probabilities, and, in addition, knowledge of how to evaluate  
        good and ills; and we need to be attentive, and, on top of all  
        that, to have the patience to carry our calculations through.  
        Finally, we need to be firmly and steadily resolved to act on  
        our conclusions; and we need skills, methods, rules of thumb,  
        and well-entrenched habits to make us true to our resolve  
        later on, when the considerations which led us to it are no  
        longer present in our minds.36    
 
      This is a very demanding program and it is not uncommon that 
one fails to reach the ideal of a Leibnizian wise man. In Discourse 
on Metaphysics, §4 Leibniz says that “those who are not satisfied 
with what God does seem to me like dissatisfied subjects whose 
attitudes are not much different from those of rebels”.37 Therefore 
Leibniz is prepared to be harsh in order not to allow “happy 
                                                     
34 A VI, 4, pp. 1535-1536; AG, pp. 37-38. 
35 See Tentamen anagogicum, GP VII, pp. 270-279. 
36 NE II, xxi, §66; A VI, 6: p. 207; RB, p. 207. 
37 A VI, 4 p. 1535, AG, p. 37. 
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sinners” − those who sin without remorse, to ruin the increase of 
perfection in the best of all possible worlds.  
 
      It can also be added that failing to develop oneself and 
acquiring knowledge is a key feature of a sinner – Leibniz argues 
in a book review that ignorance is the mother of crimes.38 He also 
adds that grace is needed for salvation:  
 
        We should not have any presumption of our powers…we  
        should labor diligently in that which concerns our salvation,     
        since it is very true that the path is narrow, and that we would  
        not be able to walk it without the assistance of grace.39  
 
      God by no means punishes or rewards his subjects randomly. 
In Leibniz’s metaphysics, God knows in advance the whole 
history of the spirits from their substantial forms and is therefore 
able to administer his subjects according to perfect justice.  
  
     Opinions vary as to whether Leibniz supported the traditional 
Christian view, according to which the sinners will burn eternally 
in hell.40 It seems that he was stricter in his earlier philosophy (for 
                                                     
38 LGR, p. 89. 
39 On the Certainty of Salvation, LGR, p. 240. 
40 See Strickland 2009 and Coudert 1995. Strickland argues that 
Leibniz held to the traditional doctrine while Coudert holds that in 
his later philosophy Leibniz supported a doctrine of universal 
salvation. Strickland argues, however, that this is to be seen as 
merely a rhetorical trick. Rather, that kind of doctrine would be 
harmful as men would expect salvation to take place without any 
effort of their own (Strickland 2009, pp. 330-331). Paul Lodge 
(2016) has challenged Strickland’s reading, ending up at the 
conclusion that there is no conclusive evidence for Leibniz’s 
commitment to the doctrine of eternal punishment – rather, he 
seems to have been neutral concerning the topic, pragmatically 
accepting both the doctrine of eternal punishment and universal 
salvation in a proper context (Lodge 2016, p. 13). However it may 
be, as Leibniz does regularly discuss of God’s punishments and 
rewards, I will in this paper suppose that at least a time in 
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example in Discourse on Metaphysics), but he was never quite 
traditionally Christian in his views. For example, in Philosopher’s 
Confession he holds a view according to which the quantity of sins 
rather than severity of a sin is the reason why a wicked person can 
be punished with damnation. This suggests that Leibniz thought 
that only those that keep on sinning eternally, disliking God and 
his creation, should be eternally punished; and this view is 
repeated in many of his other writings.41 I think this reading fits 
well with the description of a sinner being a rebel in Discourse on 
Metaphysics, §4. As we saw above, God can verify the number of 
sins from the complete notion of each substance. As the death is 
only apparent, “dying” does not stop the hating, but it goes on and 
on, eternally. However, Strickland argues that it is likely that 
Leibniz held a view according to which the damned are far less in 
number than the blessed.42 
 
      Before we turn to the organic human body in death, I would 
like to discuss a point rarely found in Leibniz-studies. Leibniz 
seems to think that human beings can have a glimpse of the 
afterlife already in their lifetime before judgement day. Leibniz 
hints at this direction in, for example, a draft called Can the bad 
outcomes of wicked actions be ascribed to wickedness?  
        
        God punishes evils and metes out rewards naturally, that is,  
        according to reasons of wisdom, or according to certain  
        universal principles (which perform the same role in moral  
       matters as laws of motion in physics), and he does so  
       immediately, at least if this is permitted by the greater    
                                                                                                            
purgatory if not hell is the fate of the evil men after death. If all 
men eventually receive universal salvation, as Coudert argues, it 
seems to be clear that for some this takes longer than for others.  
41 Strickland, op. cit. pp. 310-311, 313. According to Strickland 
the same view can also be found implicitly in the late work 
Theodicy. See op. cit., pp. 316-317.  
42 Strickland, op. cit., pp. 318-320. I cannot here discuss the 
implications of the view that one or more men are damned to 
Leibniz’s doctrine of the best of all possible worlds.  
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       reasons that should be pursued as a result of the concourse of   
       other moral matters: moral, I say, not natural.43  
 
     The context in the passage above is divine justice or theodicy, 
but if we take the point of view of the moral agent or mortal man, I 
would think the immediate reward would follow naturally. 
Happiness or unhappiness is related to virtue and intellectual 
pleasure or their opposites. When we find perfection in other 
persons, we come to love them, and the highest form of this love 
of perfection in others is love of God.44 So loving others gives us 
pleasure, and the source of that pleasure is God.45 For Leibniz, 
feeling perfection is an intellectual feeling of love and joy (as 
Leibniz defines joy as pleasure of the mind in NE II, xx, §7) and 
provides us with a motivating instant reward, a foretaste of the city 
of God or heaven, which can even extend as far as general well-
being of both soul and body. This is a sort of salvation in this life 
as Leibniz notes in On the Imagination of the Future Life:  
 
        This imagination [of future life] together with assent, in  
        which in [matters of] faith St. Thomas calls a pious affection,  
        also includes the love of God above all things, along with  




                                                     
43 LGR, p. 285. 
44 According to Leibniz, “pleasure is the feeling of a perfection or 
an excellence, whether in ourselves or in something else” (GP VII, 
p. 86; L, p. 425). 
45 Elementa juris naturalis, A VI, 4, p. 464; L, p. 137. On pure or 
disinterested love, see Roinila 2013. 
46 LGR, p. 321. It is more difficult to say what would be an 
anticipation of punishments in this life. In a forthcoming article 
Lloyd Strickland (2016) argues that unlike many of his 
contemporaries, Leibniz did not support the view that sins are 
always punished directly in this life (as misfortunes following 
from wicked actions), but punishments are reserved mostly for the 
afterlife.  
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The Human Body in Afterlife 
 
      We have seen that at least according to one interpretation, God 
can send human beings to eternal damnation despite the fact that 
they have an immortal soul. But what happens to the organic body 
in the afterlife? The following questions are bound to arise: 1) 
where exactly is the city of God/hell? 2) do human beings enter 
the afterlife with their bodies or without them?  
 
      Let me start with the latter question. Already in his earliest 
writings Leibniz was keen to follow the tradition in demonstrating 
the immortality of the soul,47 and we saw in the beginning of this 
paper that Leibniz did not accept separation of mind and bodies 
(Mon. §72). In a memoir called Reflections on the Doctrine of a 
Single Universal Spirit he gives a more explicit description of his 
views:  
 
        As far as the complete separation of soul and body, I can say  
        nothing about the laws of grace, and about the ordinances of  
        God in regard to human souls in particular, beyond what the    
        Holy Scriptures say, since these are things which cannot be  
        known by reason, being dependent on the revelation of God  
        himself. Nevertheless, I see no reason, either religious or  
        philosophical, which compels me to abandon the doctrine of  
        the  parallelism of soul and the body and to admit a perfect  
        separation. For why cannot the soul always retain a subtle    
        body organized after its own manner, which could even some  
        day reassume the form if its visible body in the resurrection,  
        since a glorified body is ascribed to the blessed, and since the  
        ancient Fathers have ascribed a subtle body to angels?48 
 
      Thus it seems that human beings do in fact preserve their 
bodies in some form after death: the organic body is transformed 
into another, glorified or subtle form comparable to the bodies of 
angels. In a very early memoir On the resurrection of bodies 
                                                     
47 See, for example, De Summa rerum, DSR, p. 61. 
48 GP VI, p. 533; L, pp. 556-557. 
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Leibniz gives a rather more mundane description of this 
transformation:  
 
        Let us…maintain that the flesh and bones remain. But how  
        are they constituted?…it is known that in each thing there is    
        a certain seminal center which diffuses itself, and contains as  
        it were the tincture and preserves the specific motion of the  
        thing. This is established from the regeneration of plants from  
        seeds…it is likewise in the bones: in our flesh…a subtler  
        part lies hidden in the spirits. When a member is cut off or    
        rots away, this subtler part returns to the fountain of life, to   
        which the soul itself is implanted. This is evident, for  
        instance, in the experience of those who have had a hand or a    
        foot cut off: they often feel these members as though they   
        were still present: they seem to be pinched, tickled and hurt,     
        for no other reason than this subtle spirit, in which the  
        substance of the member was contained, as it were, is still     
        present and exercises the same movements even now.49  
 
    These passages suggest that while the soul remains as it is in its 
lifetime, capable of retaining its memory when it is eventually 
restored to its pre-death state and having the same moral identity, 
the organic body shrinks to a subtle, kind of atomic form. 
Leibniz’s doctrine (titled “Flower of substance”) is that the soul is 
implanted into a single point of matter, and it stays that way 
permanently. However, Leibniz held this doctrine only briefly, 
from 1671 to 1676 (mentioning it in 1686). In his later texts, he 
claimed that the soul is also accompanied by a body, but that the 
matter of this body is in flux.50 Therefore the body stays with 
human beings. From this can be concluded that the city of God 
                                                     
49 LGR, pp. 306-307. 
50 This view was stated by Lloyd Strickland in a private discussion 
and later with written notes to the first version of this paper. A 
similar opinion was presented also by Robert Adams: “The monad 
always has its body…even in death, it does not cease to exist, it 
does not cease to be organic; it just undergoes sudden, drastic 
reduction in size and a change in its operations.” Adams 1994, p. 
266. 
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and hell are not some distinct locations, but around us, in another 
state of the soul (of happiness or unhappiness). They are sort of 
mental stages or theaters rather than some far-off location among 
the clouds or deep in the ground.  
 
      In a recent talk Pauline Phemister argued that human beings 
subsist in the world after their death, mirroring the world around 
them. Therefore they are capable of reflection, loving God and 
ultimately happiness – this does not of course apply to the period 
when they are “dead”, that is, in stupor, having only confused 
perceptions.51 In private discussion, Phemister also added that 
subsisting in the world would apply also to those in hell who 
suffer from the eternal torment. As we saw above, happiness as 
well as unhappiness are processes which require systematic 
efforts. I think Phemister is right − happiness in a city of God, 
wherever that is, requires maintenance as it is a (natural) reward in 
itself. One could say the same thing about punishment – perhaps it 
is a natural consequence of failure to turn the process of increasing 
displeasure and sorrow around and strive for the good?  
 
      One may argue that subsisting after death in the world 
presupposes bodily sensations. But feeling perfection or 
imperfection is an intellectual pleasure, so perhaps the rational 
soul is all that is needed and the organic or rather glorified body is 
unnecessary? I think this view would be incompatible with the 
passage in in Reflections on the Doctrine of a Single Universal 
Spirit above, as it would signify total separation of mind and body. 
So perhaps even some bodily pleasures or pains can be supposed 
to be had in the afterlife? The common man dreams about the joys 
of heaven not only in the spiritual sense, but also as a release from 
hunger and sickness while the common picture of hell is related to 
physical pain. I have not found any textual evidence on this 
question, but I have argued elsewhere that Leibniz’s views on  
bodily well-being are similar to those of Spinoza.52 Applying my 
train of thoughts to this question, the case would look like the 
following: as the pre-established harmony between the mind and 
                                                     
51 Phemister 2016.  
52 See Roinila 2011, pp. 935-936. 
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the body is likely to function in similar manner in one’s lifetime 
and in the afterlife (with respect to glorified bodies), the activity of 
the mind is felt as bodily pleasure, a kind of physical energy or 
well-being in the body. Similarly, displeasure is felt as inactivity 
and imperfection in the body. Respectively, bodily pleasure or 
pain is felt in the mind as either joy or sorrow.  
 
    Finally, I would like to give an alternative naturalistic reading 
of Leibniz’s views of afterlife which is founded on the views 
presented above. I have suggested that happiness is a process 
which is in principle similar both in this life and afterlife. As 
lasting joy, happiness does not allow human beings the possibility 
to rest on their laurels, for the loving relationship with God 
requires that we maintain our virtue and intellectual activity. If we 
ignore the common reading of Leibniz as a Lutheran for a 
moment, we may find an interesting consequence from this 
conjecture: perhaps the rewards given by God on judgement day 
are natural in the sense that they are similar to what the wise man 
can attain already in this world. 
 
    Reflecting God’s perfections and the joy that follows from 
loving him are by nature similar in this world and in the city of 
God. The difference may be that the perceptions of our body affect 
us less than in earthly life, as the body turns into a glorified form. 
So perhaps the natural reward of God for virtuous human beings in 
death is that they are less disturbed by minute perceptions which 
stem from the bodily needs and are able to have more distinct 
perceptions, which makes them more supremely happy and in this 
sense more like God. As I argue above, the activity of the mind is 
felt as a kind of well-being of the body.  
 
      But what about God’s punishments? An opposite case would 
emphasize the role of the bodily sensations. The body of a sinner 
also changes to a subtle one, but perhaps the bodily perceptions, 
that is, confused cognition, would dominate over clear and distinct 
ones, which makes us feel sorrow. In Christian tradition the 
demons torture the inhabitants of hell − perhaps the natural 
punishment for the wicked in Leibniz’s hell is being oversensitive 
to bodily, confused sensations and consequently not being able to 
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reflect God’s perfections properly. This feeling of imperfection 
and distance from God would surely lead to unhappiness.  
 
   These reflections are rather speculative and there is no direct 
textual evidence for this reading, though I think the texts I have 
discussed and the fact that Leibniz was known to support natural 
theology and religion in a number of his writings53 support it. But 
arguing for this interpretation properly requires another paper.  
 
Concluding remarks  
 
     We have seen that there is no death in a proper sense in 
Leibniz’s philosophy. Because the monads cannot be destroyed 
naturally, their “deaths” are periods of the substance’s life when 
they cannot perceive clearly or distinctly.  
  
    While Leibniz is usually thought to follow the Lutheran 
doctrines in his discussion of death of human beings (with some 
original insights), his views on the death of animals are more 
original and rather eccentric from the contemporary point of view. 
However, it is well known that Leibniz was strongly influenced by 
microscopic studies of his time and his views on the death of 
animals are clearly influenced by them. For instance, he wrote to 
Arnauld in 1687:  
 
        Mr. Leeuwenhoek holds opinions very close to mine, in that    
        he believes that even the largest animals arise through a kind  
        of transformation. I do not venture either to approve or to  
        reject the details of his opinion, but I hold this to be true in  
        general, and Mr. Swammerdam, another great investigator   
        and anatomist, gives enough evidence of also inclining  
        toward it.54  
 
      Cognitively, the deaths of human beings and animals are fairly 
similar: the level of cognition is reduced to confused perceptions 
                                                     
53 See, for example, Dialogue Between Poliander and Theophile, 
A VI, 4, pp. 2219 –2227. 
54 L, p. 345. 
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and it is a kind of sleep which is only temporary. After death, they 
return eventually to their former state with increasing clarity of 
perceptions.  
 
      The change in the level of perceptions is related to changes in 
the accompanying body. In Reflections on the Doctrine of a Single 
Universal Spirit Leibniz argues that losing organs reduces the 
level of cognition in animals (as they change their organic bodies 
little by little). This can be supposed to be the case in human 
beings as well – in his later philosophy Leibniz argues that matter 
in the accompanying body is in flux (Mon. §72), so one might 
think that temporary change in the number of organs affects the 
cognitive ability of a man in a similar way as in animals.  
 
      The most significant difference between the animals and 
human being is the fact that the latter can have afterlife and the 
former cannot. The animals transform to other animals and this 
cycle of life apparently goes on infinitely, while human beings 
have a special role in the world as rational beings and potential 
citizens of the city of God.  
 
      Leibniz is famous for his labyrinth of continuum, a view that 
everything is continuous in nature. In this respect, the strict 
distinction between kingdoms of grace and nature is curious, as it 
marks a significant difference between the deaths of human beings 
and animals. However, the obvious answer to this problem is that 
Leibniz was a Lutheran theologian, among other things, although 
not an orthodox one. The debate on the impact of Lutheranism to 
Leibniz’s views on afterlife continues and I have discussed some 
interpretations in this paper.  
 
      In addition, I have presented a non-Lutheran naturalistic 
reading of Leibnizian afterlife where this life and afterlife are not 
very different from each other. We strive for essentially the same 
goals in both, but our striving for the good in the city of God is 
less affected by our body than in earthly life. Failing to appreciate 
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God and the general good is punished after death in the form of 
being over-sensitive to bodily affections.55  
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